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DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS: AN INDIANA SURVEY
In August, 1970, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association1 unanimously approved the final draft of a report which
recommended extensive reforms in disciplinary structures and procedure
at both state and local levels.2 The ABA created the Special Committee
on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement in February, 1967, to study
the prevalent problems in enforcement of legal discipline.' The Com-
mittee's subsequent investigations and report have stimulated interest
in many jurisdictions, several of which have either begun or already
instituted reorganization of their disciplinary mechanisms.4 This note
1. Hereinafter cited as ABA.
2. ABA AMERICAN BAR NEWS, Sept. 1970, at 1.
3. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROB-
LEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT xiii (Final Draft, June,
1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA SPECIAL COMM.].
The formal charge of duties was as follows:
To assemble and study information relevant to all aspects of professional
discipline, including the effectiveness of present enforcement procedures and
practices and to make such recommendations as the Committee may deem
necessary and appropriate to achieve the highest possible standards of pro-
fessional conduct and responsibility, and . . . that the study be carried
out in cooperation with state and local bar associations.
Id. at xiii.
Information concerning existing disciplinary practices was gathered through
questionnaires distributed throughout the United States and regional hearings where
open discussions were held between judges and attorneys. The report discusses 36
prevelant problems in disciplinary enforcement which are seperated into four catigories:
financing, structure, and staff; practice and procedure; interagency relations; and
ancillary problems which are not strictly disciplinary in scope.
4. The third Judicial District in New York has restructured and centralized its
disciplinary process. The New York State Bar Association won the American Bar
Association's Award of Merit in 1969 for its cooperation in the project. Kentucky and
Florida have also recently adopted new disciplinary rules. ABA SPECIAL COM. at 192.
To provide assistance in evaluating local practice and procedure the Committee has
made the services of its Reporter available to authorized disciplinary authorities from
both state and local agencies. Committees from Utah, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Michigan are among those who have already sought to take advantage of the
collective knowledge and experience accumulated by the Committee from agencies
around the country. Id.
Reforms are overdue in light of the fact that, historically, discipline within the
profession has been regarded by those subject to it with attitudes ranging from apathy
to open hostitility. Tinkham, Admissions to the Bar in Indiana: A Critical History and
Analysis, 4 IND. L. J. 464 (1929). Those who have studied attorney discipline find it a
scandalous, "foul situation." Clark, Address to Nebraska State Bar Association, 47
NEB. L. REv. 359, 369 (1967). There are instances reported which deserve such
epitaphs. In one case, an attorney killed his wife while intoxicated. He received a ten-
year manslaughter sentence and was disbarred in his home state. Since his disbarment he
has practiced in three other states although the original disbarment is still in effect.
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will analyze the specific disciplinary enforcement problems upon which
the Committee based its recommendations and determine the extent to
which they exist in Indiana. The feasibility of implementing the pro-
posed solutions also requires evaluation; but first, to facilitate such an
analysis, a brief survey of Indiana's structure and its evolution is
necessary.
Requirements for admission to the bar were not included in the
1816 Constitution of Indiana'; thus, the opportunity to prescribe re-
quirements passed to the legislature.' In 1851 the legislature, in what
has been called an inept gesture of "a democracy gone mad,"' 7 amended
the Constitution to entitle every "voter" of "good moral character"
admission to practice law.8 As of 1926, certification to practice law in
all courts of the state could be made by any court of record.' This
Id. See also M. BLoom, THE TROUBLE WITHr LAwYEIs, (1968); Rodell, Goodbye To
Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REv. 279, 283 (1962). '... [I]t is pretty hard to find
a group less concerned with serving society and more concerned with serving them-
selves than the lawyers."
The state of disciplinary enforcement has not suddenly deteriorated in the past
few months. Authorities agree that the handling of grievances against attorneys "has
been a perplexing problem for many years." Bomberger, RFs GESTAE Apr. 1970,
at 13. There is even evidence that at Indiana's Constitutional Convention in 1850 "law
and lawyers were in disfavor with the people." Note, Admission to the Bar as Provided
for in the Indiana Cotstitutional Convention of r850-i85i, 1 IND. L. J. 209, 210 (1926).
Dissatisfaction with lawyers did not originate in 19th century Indiana, however; even
Shakespeare was moved to implore his readers "the first thing we do, let's kill all the
lawyers." KING HENRY, VI, Part II, IV, ii.
Attorney discipline fortunately is not as vindictive as Shakespeare might have had
it, however. The most commonly espoused reasons for strictly governing an attorney's
conduct are not to punish the attorney but to guard the administration of justice,
preserve the purity of the courts, protect the public and safeguard the integrity of the pro-
fession. Note, Legal Profession--Resignation from the Bar Under Charges, 26 Mo. L.
Rv. 90 (1961). The Committee voices primarily the same sentiments and adds a caution-
ary note by quoting from a state bar association ethics committee. "A good and decent
profession has a headache that cries out for fast relief. We have been put on notice
repeatedly. We will compound our own cure or someone will mix up a dose which will
curl our hair." ABA SPECIAL Comm., at 9.
5. Tinkham, supra note 4, at 464.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 465. The author found it especially difficult to reconcile Indiana's
absence of restraint on eligibility to practice with the fact that 122 years earlier England
"had deemed the preparation for the practice of law so necessarily arduous and laby-
rinthine that they had required five years of clerkship as a prerequisite." Id. Indiana
was not alone however, in what appears to have been a nation-wide "moral let down."
In 1860 only nine of the 39 states required legal training. Indiana was a bit more
reluctant than most of the other 38 states to get on with a "moral renaissance," how-
ever. It was not until 1935, after six attempts to amend the constitution through public
referendum on this point that requirements were finally imposed. Id. at 465, 466.
See Comment, In Re Todd and Constitutional Amendment, 10 INn. L.J. 510 (1935)
for a more detailed treatment concerning the amendment.
8. IiN. CoNsT. art. 7, § 21.
9. Law of April 7, 1881, ch. XXXVIII, § 832 [1881] IND. AcTs (repealed
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procedure was abolished in 1931 when the legislature passed an act
granting the supreme court exclusive jurisdiction to admit attorneys.'"
Six years later, the legislature passed two statutes which arguably
created a conflict of jurisdiction in disbarment proceedings. Chapter 88,
Acts of 1937 gave the circuit and superior courts the power to disbar
attorneys residing in their counties for certain specified offenses."
Chapter 91, Acts of 1937 authorized the supreme court to adopt, amend
and rescind rules governing practice and procedure in the state courts. 2
The Indiana Supreme Court was called upon to define the boundaries of
its jurisdiction and that of the circuit courts as provided in these acts
in Beamer v. Waddel.1" In this case, an action seeking disbarment
originated in the supreme court. The defendant contended that the
circuit court of his county had been given exclusive jurisdiction by
Chapter 88 of the Acts of 1937. The court resolved the ambiguity by
ruling that Chapter 88 when considered in pari materia with Chapter 91
merely provides concurrent jurisdiction over disbarment proceedings.'
Approximately six months later, the holding in Beamer was
expressly codified in rule 3-21 which provided that original actions to
disbar may be brought before the supreme court.' A 1965 amendment
to the rule provided: "This court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
original actions to disbar .... "16 Thus, from 1965 to date, the su-
preme court has had exclusive jurisdiction to admit or disbar attorneys.
The manner in which the supreme court has exercised this jurisdiction to
discipline and disbar will be examined in conjunction with the Committee
report.
FINANCING STRUCTURE AND STAFF
Many of the thirty-six problems the Committee found most common
1931). See Lane v. Campbell, 214 Ind. 376, 14 N.E.2d 552 (1938) for judicial inter-
pretation.
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-7405 (Burns Repl. 1968). The statute states:
The Supreme Court of this state shall have exclusive jurisdiction to admit
attorneys to practice law in all courts of the state and exclusive jurisdiction
to issue restraining orders and injunctions in all cases involving unauthorized
practice of law under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe.
11. Law of March 8, 1937, ch. 88, § 2 [1937] IND. AcTs, as amended INDIANA
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS ANNOTATED 3-21 (Bums Repl. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as IND. ANN. R. & REG.].
12. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-4718 (Burns Repl. 1968).
13. 221 Ind. 232, 45 N.E.2d 1020 (1943).
14. Id. at 239-40, 45 N.E.2d at 1022.
15. IND. ANN. R. & REG. 3-21 (Burns Repl. 1967).
16. Id. Rules 3-1 to 3-26 have been superseded by the new INDIANA RULES OF
PROcEDURE, rules A.D. 1-A.D. 28 (Bums Special Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
IND. RULES]. Rule 3-21 is now rule A.D. 23. Only the number of rule 3-21 was changed
and not its content as was the case with most rules from 3-1 to 3-26.
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such as reluctance by local agencies to proceed against prominent lawyers
or firms," substantial lack of uniformity in discipline imposed by
different local grievance committees, 8 lack of intrastate cooperation,
lack of adequate staffing and financing,"0 especially in the smaller county
bar associations, and lack of accurate and accessible statewide records,2"
have their origin in an overly-decentralized disciplinary structure con-
sisting of autonomous county bar agencies. The essence of the problem
is the lack of a centralized authority to control and coordinate' all phases
of disciplinary proceedings. Indiana's system suffers the same inadequacy.
The state has a non-integrated bar2' in which membership in any local
or statewide bar association is voluntary and the various associations are
independent of each other. There is no authority that can be exercised
to assure uniformity in their disciplinary or grievance, procedures.22
17. See note 100 infra.
18. According to their own criteria local Indiana bars utilize four alternative
sanctions: private censure, public censure, suspension from membership, or referral to
the disciplinary commission of the supreme court. See Indianapolis Bar Association,
Manual of Procedure as to Grievances, April, 1963, pt. C, §§ 1-4 [hereinafter cited
as IBA MANUAL]. The most severe punishment a local bar can impose is denial of
membership to the misbehaving attorney. However, it is through their preliminary
investigation and potential referral of the matter to the supreme court's disciplinary
commission that the offending attorney eventually may be disbarred. See notes 21-22
infra.
19. "... the most . . . significant problem in disciplinary enforcement." ABA
SPECIAL Comm. at 19.
20. Id. at 24-29.
21. A distinction must be drawn between admission to the bar in Indiana and
membership in a bar association. An integrated bar is created by legislative act or court
rule or both. This serves the purpose of establishing a quasi-governmental agency
which requires all attorneys admitted to the bar in the state to join and pay dues as a
condition to the privilege of practicing law. Winters, Integration of the Bar-You
Can't Lose, 39 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 141, 144 (1956) ; Bomberger, Some Problems of the
Indiana Bar, 13 IND. L.J. 266 (1938).
In Indiana, the supreme court has since 1931 promulgated several rules governing
admission to the bar including mandatory registration of name, office and residence.
See IN . RULES A.D. 2. However such registration does not mean that an attorney is
a member of any bar association. As a result it is estimated that at least "800 plus"
attorneys practicing in the state do not belong to the Indiana State Bar Association.
Buchanan, Ex Parte Line, REs GESTAE, Sept. 1969, at 15. Membership in city or county
bars is also voluntary. These local bars may remain completely detached from the
Indiana State Bar Association while processing a complaint under rules formulated
by their own governing boards. IBA MANUAL, pt. C, §§ 1-4. See note 22 infra.
22. The chairman of the supreme court's disciplinary commission described the
interrelationship of his commission and the local bars as follows:
Looking beyond the Commission, it may be noted that there exists the
Indiana State Bar Association, various county bar associations and various
city and town bar associations. None of these is integrated. As a result of their
own sense of professional responsibility, they have grievance committees and
they are by their own constitutions authorized to engage in efforts to police
the profession. As a matter of comity, they typically forward matters to the
Disciplinary Commission and in this sense, the Commission is the ultimate
power in matters of professional discipline, short of the Supreme Court itself.
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When complaints are initially processed at the local disciplinary
agency level, and referred to the statewide disciplinary commission only if
the local agency concludes that such action is warranted, the matter is sub-
ject to the potential consequences of close professional, personal and politi-
cal relationships between the accused attorney and the members of the
local agency.23 Moreover, a system that permits local agencies to initially
investigate and dispose of complaints hampers uniform discipline since
local criteria will inevitably be used.24
A complaint referred beyond the local level is handled by the state
disciplinary commission which was established to investigate complaints,
conduct informal hearings to determine whether there is probable cause
of professional misconduct, report its recommendations to the supreme
court, and in applicable cases file an "information"25 with the court to
initiate disciplinary proceedings.26 Upon the filing of an information,
Usually, but not invariably, the Commission involves itself in a matter only
after bar association procedures have occurred. This is because of the volume
of work and the absence of a professional staff and because the Commission
needs the local fact finding by the bar association in question in order to
determine whether a matter deserves Commission attention.
Nolan, Some Observations About Disciplinary Proceedings: A Report (unpublished),
delivered at regional hearing of ABA Special Comm. March 1968, at 2 [hereinafter
cited as Nolan, Observations]. Such reliance on local associations is not always possible
in a non-integrated bar according to one member of the Board of Governors of the Oregon
Bar, speaking shortly after integration. Jaureguy, The History of Disciplinary Matters
Before the Oregon State Bar, 3 ORE. ST. B. BULL. 9 (1937). The Board found that non-
integration resulted in disorganization, lack of facilities in remote areas, reluctance on the
part of local grievance committees to prosecute, difficulty in even locating local grievance
authorities, lack of financing for the local committees and therefore inadequate
investigation. As a result of these inherent problems in the non-integrated structure
"cases were not prosecuted, guilty attorneys were not disbarred, innocent attorneys
were not vindicated." Id. at 10. The many other advantages of bar integration, which
do not pertain directly to disciplinary proceedings, are beyond the scope of this paper.
See Winters, Integration of the Bar-You Can't Lose, 39 J. Ami. JuD. Soc'Y 141
(1956). But see Buchanan, Ex Parte, RES GESTAI, Sept. 1969, at 14. The only way
integration of the bar could be disadvantageous to disciplinary enforcement would be if
it were inseparably linked with recommendations for improvement of the disciplinary
structure and both were rejected because of a strong aversion to integration. Perhaps
this is why the Committee is careful to explain that even though integration may
greatly facilitate centralization, it is not absolutely essential. ABA SPECIAL Comm.
at 29.
23. See note 100 in!fra.
24. ABA SPECIAL Comam. at 27.
25. An information is "a plain statement of the facts which constitute the grounds
of the proceeding, addressed to the court." IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2004 (Burns Repl.
1968).
26. IND. RULES A.D. 23. This rule requires that in every case the disciplinary
commission is to file a written determination of each complaint with the supreme court.
In practice a report is not always made to the supreme court when the commission
does not recommend further proceedings or has dismissed the matter themselves because
they found no substantial issue was raised. A record of all determinations made by the
commission is kept, however, by the chairman, to be utilized in the event of an attorney's
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notice is issued to the defendant as in civil actions2 7 and the court, by
majority vote, assigns the case to one of its members. The judge rules
on all procedural questions, conducts a pre-trial conference if necessary,
hears the evidence and makes a determination with respect thereto. 8 The
elected judge may, at his discretion, refer the matter to a commissioner
for the purpose of hearing such evidence." The judge must report the
findings and recommendations to the court, which, upon review of the
record and oral arguments, if permitted, enters its judgment."0 The
supreme court and the disciplinary commission add an element of
cohesiveness to Indiana's structure. However, the chairman of the state
commission has reported that his organization suffers many of the same
problems which hamper local agencies. These include lack of funds,
inadequate personnel, unsystematized filing and records, and an absence
of continuity in membership."
The Committee suggests that the problems shared by the disciplinary
commission and the local agencies can be solved by centralizing the
being brought before the commission a second time. In addition, a "docket" of all
matters coming before the commission is maintained to inform the members of any
prior proceedings concerning the instant case. No yearly report is submitted by the
disciplinary commission to the supreme court which enumerates the number of dis-
ciplinary matters heard or breaks down the total according to method of disposition.
Interview with Alan T. Nolan, Chairman of the Supreme Court's Disciplinary Com-
mission, by telephone, Oct. 15, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Nolan, Interview]. Without
such yearly reports, it is impossible to determine how many cases actually reach the
commission or what type of discipline is administered. The Indiana State Bar Associa-
tion does compile periodic reports which reflect their grievance committee's activities.
Executive Grievance Committee of the ISBA, Report, French Lick, 1970. The cases
handled by the ISBA during the seven month period of Feb. 1, 1970 to Aug. 31,
1970 were disposed of as follows:
Cases found without merit at some stage of the Association's investigation .... 50
Remedial action taken by attorney ........................................ 18
Minor matter-no action recommended by Committee ...................... 13
Referred to Indianapolis Bar Association .................................. 1
Referred to local bar associations ........................................ 6
Referred to Disciplinary Commission:
Attorneys Cases Involved
Disbarred 2 2
Resigned 1 10
In addition, 27 of the pending complaints are still in the State Bar Associa-
tion's open files awaiting action by the Disciplinary Commission regarding 7
different attorneys. Also, 66 inquires were received . . . which were never
developed into formal complaints.
Id. at 2-3. Given the autonomy of local bar associations, it is impossible to determine
what percentage of the total proceedings carried on by all state disciplinary agencies
is represented in the report. See notes 21-22 supra.
27. IND. RULES A.D. 24.
28. IN . RULEs A.D. 26.
29. Id.
30. Im. Rur.as A.D. 27.
31. Nolan, Observations at 3.
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structure and carrying that centralization down to the "widest feasible
level." 2 In the "ideal" structure exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction is
vested in the state's highest court and a single disciplinary agency 3 is
established with members distributed throughout the state. Centraliza-
tion would also include a full-time professional staff to whom all matters
are submitted initially for investigation.3" This professional staff would
be responsible for prosecuting or assisting in the prosecution of a com-
plaint at every level of the structure until its final dispositon. 3
After an investigation has been conducted, matters which cannot
be resolved by dismissal or administrative warning are referred to an
inquiry committee for hearing, where they may be dismissed, terminated
by admonition or referred to a formal hearing committee. At the con-
clusion of the formal hearing, the record, along with findings of fact
and recommendations, are sent to the governing board of the state bar
or of the state bar association,3" or to a statewide disciplinary board.3
The reviewing board approves or modifies the earlier findings and files
its proceedings with the state's highest court. The court then makes final
determination of the matter on the basis of the record compiled by the
formal hearing committee and the briefs and oral arguments of the
parties."
Indiana's disciplinary structure is comparable to the Committee's
proposed system to the extent that the supreme court has exclusive
jurisdiction over disciplinary matters and in so far as a board has been
established. However, all similarity ends here because Indiana's efforts
to centralize do not include provisions standardizing procedures at
32. ABA Special Comm. at 28.
33. Id. at xiv.
34. Id. at xiv-xvi.
35. Id.
36. Whether the materials are sent to the governing board of the state bar or of
the state bar association depends on whether the bar of the state is integrated. See
notes 21-22 supra.
37. In jurisdictions with a sufficiently small lawyer population, this board could
conduct the formal hearing itself and file its findings with the court which would
eliminate one of the procedural stages. ABA SPEcIAL Coam. at xv.
38. ABA SPECIAL Comm. at xiv-xv. As another step toward greater centraliza-
tion, the Committee advocates establishing a permanent, professionally staffed National
Conference on Disciplinary Enforcement. Its duties would be to assist state and local
disciplinary agencies in evaluating their enforcement practices and help tailor specific
improvements to fit the needs of a particular jurisdiction. The National Conference
would also maintain the National Disciplinary Data Bank which the Committee con-
sidered so important it submitted an interim report to the ABA -louse of Delegates
summarizing the problem and recommending the Bank's prompt establishment. Id.
at 159-60. The House of Delegates authorized the establishment of the Data Bank which
is now functioning. They also approved the creation of the National Conference, which
has since been established. ABA NEws, Sept. 1970.
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the lower levels.
Inordinate delay is a problem of enforcement which can result from
an overly cumbersome structure and the absence of efficient procedures.
Indiana is susceptible to this problem at all levels of its structure:
By the time the Grievence Committee has investigated the
facts, held informal hearings, made a recommendation to the
governing body of the local association who then refers the
matter to the Disciplinary Commission for action by the Sup-
reme Court years have elapsed. Meanwhile, the association
must stand idly by wringing its hands while some bad apple
whose case is going through this process continues his misdeeds
on an unsuspecting public.3 9
A case which illustrates that delays continue even beyond the local
level in Indiana is In Re Holovachka.4 ° Holovachka was convicted in
1963 and sentenced to three years for tax evasion committed while he
had been a deputy prosecutor of Lake County. Petition for leave to
bring an original action for disbarment was filed by the Northwest
Indiana Crime Corporation, a non-profit corporation, in May of 1962."1
In June leave was granted and the proceedings were initiated, whereupon
the court found Holovachka guilty of moral decay, general depravity,
and numerous occasions of abuse of the public through corruption of his
office. Even though Indiana prohibits dilatory motions in disciplinary
proceedings, Holovachka was not finally disbarred until May, 1964: two
years after the matter was first brought to the supreme court level.
This upper level delay can be attributed to may factors. First, there
is no provision in the rules giving disciplinary matters priority in
scheduling. Second, although dilatory motions are not permitted during
39. Buchanan, Ex Parte Line, REas GESTAE, Dec. 1968, at 12. Most local associations
follow substantially the procedure mentioned. See generally IBA MANUAL, pt. C, § 4.
Most smaller bars have no manuals and several indicated that when a matter arises in
their area they refer it to a district grievance committee of the state bar association.
40. In re Holovachka, 245 Ind. 483, 198 N.E.2d 381 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 974 (1965). Other cases which indicate the possible lapse of time once a case
reaches the supreme court level are It re Hosea, 245 Ind. 680, 201 N.E.2d 560 (1964)
where two years and four months lapsed between the filing of the information and final
disposition, and Nolan v. Forste,- Ind.-, 247 N.E.2d 60 (1969) where four years and
seven months elapsed.
41. IND. RuiLas A.D. 23 states, in part, as follows:
This court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of original actions to disbar,
suspend or otherwise discipline members of the bar of this state. Such
proceedings may be instituted in this court without leave by the attorney
general of Indiana or a disciplinary commission appointed by this court.
No other person may commence such a proceeding without leave of court
first obtained....
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the hearing before the commissioner, there may be a considerable lapse
of time after the disciplinary commission files an information and before
the court refers it to a commissioner.2 Finally, even after proceedings are
commenced, it is possible that there may be an investigation, two hearings,
one pre-trial conference, and a final "original"4 review by the court before
determination, which is open to petition for rehearing.4 When combined
with the years that may elapse at the local level, where essentially the same
steps have been taken, the progress of the proceedings appears infuriat-
ingly slow to the layman who filed the complaint.
The Committee contends that this delay can be avoided by establish-
ing court rules giving disciplinary cases priority in scheduling and setting
firm dates for hearings. It also suggests avoiding the repetitive investiga-
tive stages that now cause the transfer of complaints from one disciplinary
agency to another, by centralizing the structure.42 They maintain that
one investigation, if properly conducted, would be enough. In their ideal
system a permanent professional staff does the investigating. In view of
the fact that the staff would be supervised by the disciplinary com-
mission46 they would be well-informed as to what was essential in
compiling an adequate record. Without such a staff, investigations would
be conducted by practicing attorneys on a volunteer basis. Delay would
therefore result since the volunteer's primary obligation is to his clients. 7
Other difficulties with reliance on volunteers are lack of expertise
in disciplinary matters and, in all probability, inadequate record keep-
ing.48 Without records of all complaints filed, the attorney who is never
guilty of serious misconduct but continually commits minor infractions
may never be effectively sanctioned. 9 Even with these deficiencies, the
Committee does not recommend that volunteers be removed from the
process completely. There is great value in retaining volunteers but
lightening their work load so as to allow sufficient time for them to
evaluate cases developed by the staff: a task that should be left to
42. See note 40 supra.
43. The court is not bound by the findings of the commissoner nor limited in its
review of the evidence as on appeal. In re Pawlowski, 240 Ind. 412, 165 N.E.2d 595
(1960).
44. IND. RULES A.D. 23-26.
45. ABA SPECIAL Com. at 30-31.
46. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
47. The Chairman of Indiana's Disciplinary Commission indicated that his
"fiduciary obligation to his clients" allowed only an inadequate portion of his time to be
dedicated to "Disciplinary Commission days," and even then, in addition to acting as
chairman of the commission, he had to function as its clerk. Nolan, Interview.
48. ABA SPECIAL CoMM. at 49-55.
49. Id.
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practicing lawyers fully conversant with the problems of day-to-day
practice. The creation of a centralized professional staff under the
supervision of the disciplinary commission could also help to solve the
problem of inadequate funding for investigation. Local bar associations,
since they have very few members, typically have limited resources.With
a centralized professional staff there is the possibility of the legislature
appropriating funds for it directly, or perhaps part of the appropriation
allotted to the supreme court could be budgeted for the staff."
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The Committee advanced the proposition that the manner in which
investigation of an attorney is initiated is a controlling factor in the
effectiveness of the profession's disciplinary enforcement. For instance,
most state disciplinary agencies rely upon individuals to file a specific
complaint 5' rather than actively seeking to discover attorney mis-
conduct.2 Such reliance will never uncover professional misconduct which
results from collusion or conspiracy between the attorney and client."
In Indiana some local agencies may, according their own rules, institute
investigation without a written complaint," and the supreme court, in
one case, ordered its own disciplinary commission to do likewise."
50. The Committee does not recommend that the costs of investigative proceedings
be assessed against respondent attorneys. They reasoned that making the costs a
condition precedent to filing a motion for reinstatement would place an unreasonable
premium on the disciplined attorney's financial ability. ABA SPEciAL CoMm. at 23.
Funds for the Indiana Disciplinary Commission currently come out of the supreme
court's budget. Nolan, Observations at 3. The amount would have to be substantially
increased to support a professional staff.
51. Requiring written complaints is undesirable because an aggrieved party may
have no confidence in his ability to adequately state his complaint or fear some form of
reprisal if he submits anything in writing. ABA SpEcIAL COMM. at 73.
52. The Committee felt that responsibility for disciplinary enforcement falls upon
the bar itself, therefor, its standards of conduct must be maintained by the profession,
not policed by sporadic complaints from laymen. Id. at 61; Accord People ex rel. Karlin
v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 480, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (1928). "If the house is to be cleaned,
it is for those who occupy and govern it rather than strangers, to do the noisome
work." Id.
53. ABA SPECIAL CoMm. at 89.
54. See generally IBA MANUAL, pt. E, § 2, "Oral Charges":
The chairman of any committee on grievances may also recieve a grievance
charge orally and without being subcribed when, in his discretion, such
course is justified. Oral charges and grievances should, however, be the
exception to the general rule that grievances should be in writing and in
the form set out above.
55. Beamer v. Waddel, 221 Ind. 232, 45 N.E.2d 1020 (1943). Defendant, as
relator, had earlier instituted an original action in the supreme court for a writ of
mandate against a superior court judge. In considering that case it came to the court's
attention that there were matters connected therewith that might call for disciplinary
action.
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However, the problems of inadequate funds, limited staff and reluctance
to discipline close associates which are common at the local bar level,
lead to almost total dependence upon individual complaints." The Com-
mittee points out that centralization is the first step toward eliminating
these problems and assuming a more aggressive role. To initiate pro-
ceedings without a specific complaint other sources of information about
misconduct are needed. Subscribing to a newspaper clipping service,
establishing a liaison with the criminal courts and police departments of
the state, and perhaps even checking with insurance associations to
discover the filing of exaggerated personal injury claims are methods
which can be employed to provide the necessary information.5"
Included in the category of procedural problems is the failure to
grant absolute immunity from civil suit to complainants or absolute
immunity from criminal prosecution to witnesses who have colluded with
an attorney for illegal purposes and thus may incriminate themselves
while testifying in disciplinary matters. In the former case, a layman
who is fearful of being subjected to suit if his complaint is not sub-
stantiated will hesitate to file a grievance. Instead of inhibiting com-
plaints in this manner, the profession should encourage the reporting of
unethical conduct.5" In a case of collusion, it is unlikely that the client
will testify against his attorney if he runs the risk of prosecution based
upon his own testimony. The Supreme Court of Indiana has not provided
immunity in either case. A court rule would be sufficient to establish
absolute immunity from civil suit." To insure immunity from criminal
prosecution, however, would probably require legislative action."
56. The disciplinary commission itself must receive a complaint in writing before
investigation begins at that level. IND. RULES A.D. 23. Even where the complaint is
based on an attorney's felony conviction, verification is required before the commission
can file an information. See note 62 infra.
57. ABA SPECIAL COzaM. at 60-66.
58. The public's interests and the integrity of the legal profession are protected
most adequately when the profession encourages "those who have knowledge of
dishonest or unetheical conduct to impart that knowledge to a grievance committee or
some other body designated for investigation." Weiner v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 332,
292 N.Y.S.2d 667, 669, 239 N.E.2d 540, 541 (1968). In this case the New York Court
held that a complaint is absolutely privileged. Accord, Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass.
392 (1884); McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933); Raustead v.
Morgan, 219 Ore. 383, 347 P.2d 594 (1959).
59. See note 58 supra.
60. The statute proposed by the Committee includes the following provisions:
1. The power to confer immunity in the course of a disciplinary proceeding
shall be vested in the court having disciplinary jurisdiction.
2. Any request that a witness or an accused attorney be granted immunity
shall be made upon formal application by an authorized disciplinary agency,
a copy of which shall be served upon the local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies having jurisdiction within a specified time prior
to the return date of the application.
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The Committee also recommended a court rule which would provide
that disciplinary proceedings be deferred until after the determination of
pending civil or criminal suits involving substantially similar material
allegations."' However, a defendant attorney would not be given the
benefit of this rule if he unreasonably delays the pending suit. Indiana's
rules are unclear as to whether disciplinary proceedings are to be held in
abeyance in this type of situation. Rule A.D. 23(5) provides that if a
complaint based upon a felony conviction is verified by a competent
source, then disciplinary proceedings shall be initiated. 2 The rule fails
to expressly prohibit commencing proceedings on a complaint which
3. A copy of every order conferring immunity shall be served upon the law
enforcement agency.
ABA SPEcaL COMM. at 91. Section 2 of the proposed statute would allow law enforce-
ment authorities an opportunity to voice any objections to granting immunity in any
particular case. If raised, that objection would then have to be weighed by the court
against the necessity of granting immunity for the purposes of the disciplinary pro-
ceeding. The Committee's proposed statute would also confer immunity from criminal
prosecution to the accused attorney but recommends that requests for application of the
statute to such attorneys be sparingly made for two reasons:
• . . the issue of whether a disciplinary proceeding is essentially criminal or
civil in nature is being litigated constantly, and it has not been determined
finally. Should the courts ever determine that a disciplinary proceeding is
essentially criminal, any immunity granted . . . will immunize him against the
very disciplinary proceeding in which the immunity was granted. Second,
whenever the disciplinary agency has developed . . . a prima facie case, the
accused attorney who refuses to testify on the ground that it ill tend to
incriminate him thereby virtually abandons any defense to the charges.
Id. at 91.
Until Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) courts could hold failure to cooperate
with the disciplinary agency as misconduct in itself and disbar for that reason. Spe'vack
held that where the complaint involves conduct which might subject the attorney to
criminal prosecution the attorney may invoke his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination and refuse to respond to the agency's inquiries. It is no doubt partially
because of this decision that the Committee recommends holding disciplinary proceedings
in abeyance until the determination of pending criminal suits. See note 61 infra.
61. The Committee felt that the disciplinary proceedings should be held in abey-
ance for several reasons. First, whenever tvo tribunals consider the same facts sim-
ultaneously there is the possibility they may reach opposite or inconsistent results. In
such cases respect for the integrity of one or the other tribunal is lowered. Also, the
outcome of a disciplinary proceeding may prejudice the result in related litigation. A
jury may be asked to resolve an issue knowing that the attorney's peers have decided
the same issue against the attorney but not appreciating the fact that the burden of
proof is lower in disciplinary proceedings than the case they are trying. ABA SPECIAL
Comm. at 83.
62. IND. RULES A.D. 23(5) provides as follows:
Upon verification from any source that the commission considers competent
involving a complaint based upon conviction of an attorney for a felony,
the commission shall file an information.
This rule could be interpreted as a direction to defer disciplinary proceedings until
final determination of pending cases but such has not been the case. See In re Holo-
vachka, 245 Ind. 483, 198 N.E.2d 381 (1964). In this case disciplinary proceedings were
initiated in June of 1962, almost exactly one year before sentence was delivered in the
criminal prosecution.
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does not allege conviction. In one case disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against an attorney while he was being prosecuted for a criminal
offense.6" However, the complaint which initiated the disciplinary hear-
ings alleged several additional instances of misconduct. Thus, the ques-
tion of what procedure to follow when disciplinary hearings and criminal
suits involve basically the same material allegations was not resolved.
Whatever policy is followed, it is clear that rule 23 fails to order the
instigation of disciplinary proceedings when no complaint is filed and
the attorney is purposely delaying criminal prosecution. If the Com-
mittee's recommendations were adopted the question of priority would be
resolved and potential delays could be easily avoided.
Under the present Indiana Supreme Court rules the disciplinary
commission has full powers of investigation, including subpoena power.6"
The Committee recommends this but suggests that, in addition, sub-
poena power be extended downward to every authorized disciplinary
agency as well as to the attorney under investigation." Subpoena power
is essential in that if the parties cannot be compelled to attend or produce
evidence there will be little information upon which the agency can base
its findings. Some control over the use of the power must be retained,
however, to prevent its misuse. A centralized disciplinary agency would
provide the necessary supervision.66
Some of the most serious matters considered by disciplinary agencies,
and which are often mishandled, 7 are complaints alleging that attorneys
have violated their fiduciary relationships with their clients. Disciplinary
agencies have made it a practice to automatically dismiss complaints if
restitution is made.68 The problem in withholding discipline if restitution
is made is that the attorney is not deterred from converting funds in the
future. Instead, it may lead to the attorney's cheating a present client to
repay a past one; there is obviously little deterrent value in a system
which allows someone to steal repeatedly with nothing more to fear
than having to give the money back if he is caught.
Indiana has no firm rule on what action is to be taken if an attorney
63. See notes 40 and 62 supra and text accompanying.
64. IND. RULES A.D. 23.
65. IBA MANUAL, pt. B, § 3 (1963). The Indianapolis Bar Association manual
illustrates the powers of local disciplinary agencies with the following two statements:
"The Association does not have the power to subpoena witnesses . . . . No right
exists in the Association to compel any cooperation of the respondent attorney."
66. The Committee stated further that if the disciplinary agency could not supply
the needed supervision, subpoenas should be obtained by application to the court having
disciplinary jurisdiction. ABA SPECIAL Comm. at 87-88.
67. ABA SPECIAL COMm. at 97.
68. Id.
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makes restitution, however, an informal poll conducted by telephone
revealed that some local agencies have made it a practice to dismiss
disciplinary proceedings upon restitution.69 In one case, the secretary of
a county bar association recalled a situation where a majority of the
grievance committee rejected a proposal to investigate other instances
of misconduct simply because restitution had been made. A court rule
which provides that restitution shall not justify, in and of itself, the
termination of a disciplinary investigation would prevent this type of
practice.70
Resignation by the accused attorney is similar to restitution in that
it may terminate disciplinary proceedings. Problems may arise if the
disciplinary agency is satisfied with a simple resignation and fails to
complete its investigation. If the attorney applies for readmission years
later the record of his misconduct will be incomplete and much of the
evidence may no longer be available. The Committee recommends a court
rule which would allow the attorney to resign only if he acknowledges
69. The presidents or secretaries of ten local bars were contacted during this poll.
See also TBA MANUAL, pt. D, § 7:
If a case of established embezzlement exists, the grievance should not be
considered closed merely because the misappropriated funds are, upon prodding
... delivered to the client.
But see pt. D, § 7 which also provides:
Every pressure must be exerted upon the respondent attorney to inducehim to account to his client. The same admonition prevails if an attorney
accepts a retainer, does nothing, and then refuses to refund the money to the
client on demand. If the efforts of the Association are unavailing, the
grievance file should be promptly forwarded to the disciplinary commission....
Thus, it appears that in some cases restitution will prevent disciplinary proceedings.
The Committee recognizes that arguments can be made for encouraging restitution,
such as: few victims of conversion would ever be reimbursed if it were not to the
accused attorney's benefit to do so; and the argument that disbarment removes all
sources of the attorney's income thus making a civil judgment, as an alternative to
reimbursement, worthless. The Committee concluded these arguments were outweighed
by other considerations. First any policy that benefits a single complainant while
exposing the public to the same risks is inconsistent with the primary goal of protecting
the public. Second, client security funds can be created to protect individual victims.
Finally, restitution, although not the primary goal of the agency, should not be dis-
regarded-only demoted to the status of a mitigating factor in disciplinary proceedings.
ABA SPECIAL COMM. at 99.
The Indiana State Bar Association established a client security fund of the type
the Committee recommends by a resolution of its House of Delegates in July, 1964. The
fund is not expressly limited to claimants who have been wronged by members of
that association: "provided that the lawyer against whom said claim is being made is
a practicing member of the Bar of Indiana. . . ." The claimant must exhaust all civil
remedies, and the association will endeavor to provide him with legal assistance in
that process. As of July 17, 1970, the amount in the fund was 42,776.80 dollars. Report
of Clients' Security Fund Committee of the Indiana State Bar Association, at 2
(July 1970).
70. ABA SPECIAL COMM. at 97-100. It would be difficult to enforce such a rule
uniformly in a structure composed of a number of autonomous bars.
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in writing that the material facts upon which the complaint is predicated
are true. The order striking the attorney's name from the rolls of the bar
would then contain a phrase such as "for due cause" or "transferred to
inactive status" which would alert reviewing authorities to the fact that
there was misconduct connected with the resignation if the attorney
applies for readmission.7
Indiana has no such rule. However, there is some precedent per-
taining to resignation under charges. The court, in In re Lucas"2 held
that it was too late to resign after an appointed commissioner had
recommended disbarment. Unfortunately, it was not made clear at
exactly what point in the proceedings it becomes too late to avoid dis-
barment by resigning, or if it is possible at any time. Some clarification
was provided by two recent orders of the supreme court." Both
orders were in response to petitions of resignation submitted to the court
by attorneys who were under investigation by bar associations. Resigna-
tions were allowed in both cases and disciplinary proceedings were ter-
minated. However, neither attorney was required to sign a statement to
the effect that the allegations in the complaints were true. Only one
order stated that the deprivation of the right to practice was "for due
cause." In this case, the attorney asked that his name be stricken for due
cause apparently because simple resignation was not enough to induce
the bar association's grievance committee to terminate proceedings con-
cerning his alleged embezzlement. The other attorney was undergoing
grievance committee proceedings based upon voluminous complaints of
incompetence caused by incapacitating personal problems. His petition of
resignation did not ask that the order contain a special designation such
as "transferred to inactive status," and none was applied. Therefore,
71. Id. at 104-05. The order should indicate that the attorney is being disbarred on
consent or for due cause or "transferred to inactive status." This would serve to
distinguish a resignation under charges from one submitted for other reasons. Indiana
has had the benefit of such a distinction. Nolan v. Brawley, -Ind.-, 244 N.E.2d 918
(1969). In that case the attorney had been the subject of disbarment proceedings in
Wisconsin for converting a client's funds. Informal hearings had been held, and
recommendations for disbarment were sent to the state bar commissioners. While
disbarment proceedings were pending, the attorney submitted his resignation to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. An order was entered striking his name from the rolls
of the court "for due cause." The Indiana Supreme Court held that the attorney "was,
in effect, disbarred" in Wisconsin for due cause. In applying this to the proceedings
at bar the court held:
Disbarment in another state is the basis for disbarment proceedings in Indiana.
Resignation "for cause" during the course of disbarment proceedings must
also be a basis for disbarment.
244 N.E.2d at 922-23.
72. 230 Ind. 254, 102 N.E.2d 909 (1952).
73. In light of the confidential nature of the disciplinary proceedings connected
with these cases, no specific identification of the orders is made.
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upon application for readmission unless the members of the reviewing
body happen to remember the circumstances surrounding this attorney's
resignation, he will not be required to prove he has rehabilitated him-
self. As these two cases illustrate, Indiana's policy toward resignation
under charges does not always alert a reviewing board to prior mis-
conduct. When it does, the board is left with an inadequate record of that
misconduct. Implementation of the suggested rule would resolve the
inconsistancies in the treatment of resignations and provide a written
admission of the prior misconduct.
Indiana has long recognized the danger in licensing unfit persons
by requiring applicants for admission to the bar to possess good moral
character and fitness. 4 In addition, Indiana's Supreme Court has ruled
that a "rusty or incompetent" applicant may be denied admission. Yet,
there is no rule which applies similar standards to practicing attorneys.
One officer of a local Indiana bar, with a membership of under twenty-
five attorneys, explained that his bar thought they had authority to
sanction incompetent or alcoholic members. However, it was rarely done
because of the close personal relationships that develop between members
of a small bar association." A court rule which could be uniformly
applied throughout the state would therefore be well received.
The Committee suggests that any attorney shown to be incapacitated
by mental illness, senility, or addiction to drugs or intoxicants be
indefinitely suspended or transferred to inactive status until such time
as the incapacity no longer exists.7 If adopted, the supreme court would
implement its expressed desire to protect the public from incompetent
attorneys. Local disciplinary authorities could also be relieved of their
unpleasant obligation to sanction their every-day acquaintances if the
rule were adopted in conjunction with centralization of the disciplinary
structure and the creation of a professional staff who have not established
regional friendships and loyalties.
An attorney who has been convicted of a crime yet is permitted to
74. I1p. Rurms A.D. 12.
75. Stern v. State Board of Law Examiners, 245 Ind. 526, 535, 199 N.E.2d
850, 854 (1964).
76. This information was compiled in an informal survey taken by telephone.
See note 69, supra.
77. The Committee is not referring to occasional imbibing or clashing of per-
sonalities between lawyer and client. Their concern is over cases where the attorney's
addiction or mental deterioration makes him a risk to all his clients. The Committee
would no doubt agree with the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar that being
intoxicated in a public place or giving an "opinion as to the veracity and perhaps
ancestry of" a client are not cases warranting discipline. Jaureguy, The History of
Disciplinary Matters Before the Oregon State Bar, 3 ORE. ST. B. BuLL. 9, 11 (1937).
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continue practice, also damages the reputation of the legal profession.
In addressing itself to this problem, the Committee stated:
No single facet of disciplinary enforcement is more to blame
for any lack of public confidence in the integrity of the bar than
the policy that permits a convicted attorney to continue to
practice while apparently enjoying immunity from discipline."'
To remedy this regrettable situation it recommended a court rule provid-
ing for suspension of an attorney convicted of a "serious crime" 9 while his
case is on appeal. Final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding based on
the conviction would not be made until all appeals had been exhausted.
If the attorney was granted a reversal, he would then be reinstated; if
after appeal the conviction still stood, disciplinary proceedings would
then commence. 0 Existing Indiana rules indicate that a contrary pro-
cedure is followed.81 Convicted attorneys are not suspended, and in
addition, initiation of disciplinary proceedings is usually held in abeyance
until all appeals have been exhausted. This procedure allows lengthy
periods of time to elapse before the public is protected from the miscon-
duct of an attorney.
Publication of the actions taken by disciplinary agencies is also
necessary in rebuilding the public's confidence in the integrity of the bar.
The Committee recommends that the existence of pending disciplinary
proceedings be made a matter of public record if the charges are based
upon a criminal conviction, or if the respondent attorney requests a
public hearing.12 Disclosure is limited to these cases in an attempt to
balance the interests of the accused and the public. An attorney who is
publicly charged but later acquitted suffers irrevocable harm despite his
78. ABA SPECIAL CoIim. at 124.
79. "Serious crime" according to the Committee's proposed rule, means:
... a felony or any specified lesser crime a necessary element of which, as
determined by the statute defining such crime, reflects upon the attorney's
fitness. The lesser crimes . . . should include, for example, interference with
the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful
failure to file an income tax return, deceit, corruption, coercion, misappropriation,
theft, or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a "serious
crime."
Id. at 128.
80. The Committee rejected the argument that immediate suspension following
conviction of a serious crime violates due process. In the course of the criminal
-prosecution, the attorney is accorded the right to be advised of the charges, to cross-
examine witnesses, and to testify in his own behalf. The only function performed by
the court imposing suspension in such a situation is to determine whether the con-
viction was for a "serious crime." Id. at 127.
81. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
82. ABA SPECIAL Collar. at 138.
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acquittal. On the other hand, the public is reassured of the integrity of
the profession and warned of potentially dishonest attorneys when dis-
ciplinary proceedings are publicized. The recommendation strikes an
equitable balance since an attorney publicly convicted of a crime or
seeking a public hearing cannot validly assert that he is being treated
unjustly if the disciplinary proceeding is not kept confidential.
The Indiana Supreme Court rule on this matter strikes no balance
whatsoever. It simply states that other than a report from the disciplinary
commission to the court the "Commission shall not otherwise disclose
the result or the nature of such information."8 An informal survey of
local bar associations indicates that it is also their practice not to disclose
the pendancy of disciplinary proceedings.84 In light of the Committee's
recommendation for greater disclosure of the full scope of disciplinary
activities, these rules should be re-evaluated.
The need to protect an individual client continues even after the
offending attorney has been disbarred. The Committee suggests a court
rule for post-suspension or disbarment supervision which demands that
the attorney notify all clients within a reasonable time of his inability to
continue to represent them.8" Whenever suspension is for disability, or
83. INn. RULEs A.D. 23 (4).
84. See also IBA MANUAL, pt. C, § 2, "Public Censure":
This will consist of a notice to be posted on any bulletin board maintained
by the Association, by announcement made at a general meeting, by a letter
addressed to the judges of the circuit and superior courts of Marion County,
Indiana, by a written report to the Disciplinary Commission and by a written
report to the Secretary of the Indiana State Bar Association.
Clearly such a provision will not make the actions of the disciplinary agency known
to the general public.
The Indiana State Bar Association's monthly publication, REs GESTAE, has not
included a column on "Disciplinary Matters" since June, 1964. The editor indicates
that there has been a change in policy and that REs GESTAE is not to be used as a
medium for censure or punishment. Interview with Newton M. Goudy, Editor of
Ras GsTAE, by telephone October 10, 1970. Lawyers have, in effect, a monopoly over
their profession. Q JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsoN, LAwvRS AND THEM WORK, ch. 5
(1967). This monopoly includes information pertaining to grievance committee functions.
See note 83 supra, and accompanying text. Clearly, if the profession itself does not
strive to keep the public informed about its self-policing efforts, it will not be done.
ABA SPEcIA. Comm. at 143-46. Traditionally the hesitance to publicize such efforts
had its origin in the theory that the public image of the profession is damaged by a
disclosure of attorney misconduct. This policy is, perhaps centuries too late. See note 4
supra. What is called for is a policy which reassures the public that the profession
acknowledges that misconduct sometimes *occurs, and that all feasible steps are being
taken to maintain the integrity of its predominately honest membership. If this is not
done, the public is left with the impression that lawyers as a group do not care or are
incapable of independent action. See Royko, Chicago Bar Pot Announces Police Dept.
Kettle Black, Indianapolis News, May 26, 1970, at 9, col. 1. "The bar association should
reconsider letting a panel of non-lawyers, or a mixture of both, weigh the complaints of
citizens."
85. ABA SPEcrAL Comir. at 148.
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the attorney disappears or dies while under investigation, the disciplinary
agency should determine whether a partner or other appropriate repre-
sentative of the attorney is available to notify the clients. If notification
cannot be carried out in this manner, then the court having jurisdiction
should make provisions for their protection. Indiana has no rule to this
effect. Consequently, these protective steps are only undertaken by the
disciplined attorney or his partners on their own initiative.
Indiana is also in conflict with the Committee's recommendations in
another area of post-disciplinary supervision. A prevalent problem, ac-
cording to the Committee, is that attorneys are too readily reinstated.
In Indiana, reinstatement is governed by rule A.D. 8 which requires a
showing of good cause by the attorney in a hearing conducted by a
court-appointed commissioner who makes findings of fact and recom-
mendations. The record must include a finding as to the capacity of the
applicant to re-enter practice taking into consideration the length of time
during which the applicant has not practiced.8" There is no minimum
period of time set for disbarment, which thus makes it possible for an
attorney who has been disbarred to be reinstated before a suspended
attorney who must wait until the end of a specific period. Precisely this
result has been reached in Indiana. In Bell v. Conner,8" where the
respondent had been guilty of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and corrupt
conduct, the supreme court held that a combination of these offenses and
the fact that the attorney had been practicing for 45 years "leads us to
the conclusion that respondent should be disbarred.""8 However, the
court included a provision permitting him to apply for reinstatement in
six months. In Baker v. Miller,89 the court suspended the respondent
for nine months after commenting that there was no specific showing of
moral turpitude on the part of the respondent.
Allowing the disbarred attorney to be reinstated before the sus-
pended one, reverses the order of magnitude originally ascribed to their
respective misdeeds. The situation in Indiana, therefore, is an appropriate
one for the application of the Committee's recommendation. It suggests
a court rule that specifies that either a disbarred attorney shall not be
re-admitted at all or that a specified period of time, exceeding the
maximum period for suspension, must elapse before a disbarred attorney
may apply for reinstatement."
86. IND. RULES A.D. 8.
87. - Ind. -, 241 N.E.2d 360, 360-61 (1968).
88. Id.
89. 236 Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145 (1956).
90. Indiana has no maximum period of suspension set out by court rule. There is
precedent for suspension up to three years. In re Bradburn, 248 Ind. 29, 221 N.E.2d
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INTERAGENCY RELATIONS
The lack of communication between the federal and state courts and
between the states themselves so concerned the Committee that it
submitted an interim report to the American Bar Association recommend-
ing the immediate establishment of the National Discipline Data Bank."'
Cooperation was solicited from all states in the hope that every court
and disciplinary agency would submit reports of all formal disicpline
imposed by them for dissemination to every disciplinary agency within
the United States. Without such sharing of information attorneys would
be able to practice in some jurisdictions even though they had been dis-
barred in others. The disciplinary commission of the Supreme Court in
Indiana does participate in this project and receives quarterly reports
from the Bank. Informal discussions with disciplinary officials of bar as-
sociations indicated, however, that this information is not made available
to them and there is speculation that the reports will never be circulated
lower than the state bar association. Once again, the reason for this
truncated allocation of power92 and resources is attributable to Indiana's
decentralized disciplinary structure.
There is danger in limiting access to this information to the supreme
court level. A complaint initiated at the local level may be deemed trivial
and thus dismissed; however, if it were viewed in light of discipline
imposed in other jurisdictions, it may be indicative of a consistent
pattern of professional misbehavior which seriously endangers the public
welfare. Part of the reluctance of the court to disseminate such informa-
tion fully may be out of concern that it will pass into unauthorized hands.
885 (1966). In that case, the respondent was found to have accepted and spread
bribes while a city council member. He also failed to report the money as income.
But see Supreme Court v. Worrel, 245 Ind. 626, 201 N.E.2d 330 (1964), where the
respondent was convicted of passing counterfeit bills and sentenced to one year in
prison. He was disbarred by the court but allowed to apply for readmission after one
year, apparently because he claimed he had no knowledge that the bills were counterfeit.
91. See note 38 mipra.
92. There is some allocation of power to the Indiana State Bar Association, but
it is tied to the supreme court's disciplinary commission in the following manner:
A disciplinary commission is hereby created consisting of one [1] member
appointed by each member of the Supreme Court from his respective district.
The term of each member shall be for a period of five [5] years, which
term shall commence on January 1st for the term appointed and shall con-
tinue thereafter until his successor is appointed. The Indiana State Bar
Association shall appoint three [3] members, who shall be the executive
committee of the grievance committee of said bar association. Such three [3]
members shalf be ex-officio members of the disciplinary commission of this
court. They shall serve at the will of the court for a period of one [1] year
beginning on September 1st of each year....
I"'. Rur.Es A.D. 23.
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The risk of this occuring could be minimized by creating the centralized
structure the Committee recommends.
ANCILLARY PROBLEMS
The last segment of the Committee's report deals with problems that
do not arise solely out of the structure or procedure of disciplinary
mechanisms. The first problem is a reluctance on the part of lawyers and
judges to report instances of professional misconduct.9" The legal pro-
fession has labeled this the conspiracy of silence when it occurs in the
medical profession.94 The Committee recommends that law school in-
struction and other legal training9" place a greater emphasis upon the
attorney's responsibility to assist in the profession's efforts to police itself.
The Committee further advises imposing sanctions upon attorneys and
judges who fail to report known misconduct. Indiana's position on this
point is unclear. The oath attorneys must take upon admittance to the
bar99 could be construed as imposing such a duty and it is clear that the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Ethics of the ABA
do so.9" However, the Indiana Supreme Court has not yet adopted the
93. See note 100 infra.
94. The need for discipline is not limited to the medical and legal professions,
however. It is estimated that in Florida as early as twenty years ago there were over
75,000 persons whose professional licenses were subject to challenge in disciplinary
proceedings. Eliot, The Problem of Discipline, 7 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 396, 397 (1954).
The breadth of the licensing field in California includes oil and gas brokers, boxers,
wrestlers, horse racers and dealers in prophylactics. Id. The extension of mandatory
licensing and the restrictions on permissible practice flowing therefrom are attributable
to a desire to protect the public in an age of phenomenal increase in available services.
Id. It would be a futile exercise to attempt to draft a general conduct code to apply
equally to all who must be licensed, however, if there is a nexus between disciplinary
enforcement in the diverse "professions" it is the legal profession. The lawyer is the
"guardian of 'due process' as it applies to the procedures of other licensing boards."
Id. at 401. The bar, should therefore set an example in disciplinary enforcement for
other occupations. Id.
95. "[O]ther legal training" includes judicial training courses and continuing
legal education programs conducted by bar associations.
96. . . . I do solemnly swear or affirm that: I will support the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Indiana; I will
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers; I will
not counsel or maintain any action, proceeding, or defense which shall appear
to me to be unjust, but this obligation shall not prevent me from defending a
person charged with crime in any case; I will employ for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to me, such means only as are consistent with
truth, and never seek to mislead the court or jury by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law; I will maintain the confidence and preserve in-
violate the secrets of my clients at every peril to myself; I will abstain
from offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which I am charged....
IND. RULES A.D. 22.
97. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL
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Code of Professional Responsibility" and views the Canons of Ethics
only as evidence of proper standards of conduct.9 Adoption of the
Committee's proposal would eliminate the uncertainty and also serve to
remove the stigma of "informer" from attorneys who comply with its
provisions since they would be left with no choice but to report mis-
conduct or face possible disbarment themselves.'
Adding to the difficulty in discovering misconduct is the fact that
there are often no requirements that attorneys keep accurate records of
client funds in their possesion, have the accounts audited, or retain the
records after disbursement has been made. In Indiana the only statutory
requirements are that the attorney "promptly account to and pay over to
a client any moneys coming into . . . [his] . . . hands and to which the
client is lawfully entitled."'' The failure to require that accurate records
be complied makes it possible that there will be no evidence to sub-
stantiate clients' claims of discrepancies. If records are required but the
attorney is not made to keep them for a specified period after disburse-
ment has been made he may destroy them if a complaint is filed. The
Committee recommends a court rule be adopted requiring the main-
tenance of records for a reasonable period of time after final distribution
of all funds and that these records be audited annually. 2 Implementation
ETHIcS D.R. 1-103(A): "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation
of D.R. 1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered
to investigate or act upon such violation!'
ABA CANONS OF PRoFEssIoNAL ETHICS No. 29: "The lawyer should expose
without fear or fault before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the
profession."
ABA CANONS OF JuDIcIAL ETHICS No. 11: "A judge should utilize his oppor-
tunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counsellors,
brought to 14is attention; and, if adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should
send the matter at once to the proper investigating and disciplinary authorities."
98. The Indiana State Bar Association has approved the Code and transmitted it
to the state supreme court with a recommendation for adoption. ABA Coordinator,
September, 1970, at 4.
99. Bell v. Conner, - Ind.- , 241 N.E.2d 360 (1968); Tokash v. State, 232
Ind. 668, 115 N.E.2d 745 (1953).
100. Fear of being labelled with such stigma, especially in counties with a small
lawyer population, is part of the reason for the reluctance to report misconduct. There
is also professional hesitance to deprive brother attorneys of their means of earning a
livelihood. The Committee cautions that, the adoption of a benevolent, "live and let
live" attitude is often done at the public's expense.
Evidence that such sentiment exists in Indiana is provided by Baker v. Miller,
236 Ind. 20, 27, 138 N.E.2d 145, 149 (1956) wherein the court maintains:
This court cannot bring itself to say that a wilful attempt to evade a tax
imposed by statute, even if defined by the statute as a felony, should auto-
matically disbar an attorney from his profession, and strip him from his
livelihood in which he probably spent most of his life.
101. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-7408 (Burns Repl. 1968).
102. ABA SPEcIAL CoizmM. at 173.
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of this recommendation is urged as a means to uncover and preserve
evidence of misconduct.
The Committee's final recommendation concerns providing ancillary
bar association services to complement the work of disciplinary agencies
because relations with the lay public cannot be improved solely through an
agency whose dealings are primarily with members of the profession.'
These ancillary services would deal with conflicts between laymen and
attorneys which do not fall within the jurisdiction of the disciplinary
agency. For example, establishment of mechanisms for handling claims
against attorneys, arbitration of fee disputes and client security funds are
recommended. Other than fulfilling a public relations function, the
Committee also maintains that these procedures are necessary by virtue
of the fact that attorneys seldom agree to accept a case involving a claim
against another attorney." 4 The Indiana State Bar Association has taken
commendable steps to establish procedures for providing legal assistance
for individuals with claims against attorneys in connection with their
client security fund.' However, the amount in the fund and the extent
of legal assistance they can provide are limited by the size of their
membership and the free time of volunteers. Centralization would provide
a professional staff to aid these volunteers, and integration of the bar0 6
could vastly increase the amount of money allotted to such services. 7 In
addition to making the services more efficient, centralization and in-
tegration would allow them to serve as a tangible demonstration of the
concern and responsible attitude of the entire bar.
CONCLUSION
After three years of study the Committee found disciplinary en-
forcement to be virtually nonexistant in many jurisdictions. Its report
warned that unless the legal profession promptly adopts radical reforms
it will be faced with public participation in the disciplinary process. There
must be more centralization, greater delegation of power and swifter
action. The concept of autonomous local agencies must give way to a
centralized authority employing a full-time professional staff. Only re-
forms made on this scale can provide comprehensive and effective dis-
ciplinary enforcement.
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105. See the discussion of the ISBA's client security fund in note 69 supra.
106. See notes 21-22 supra.
107. See Jaureguy, The History of Disciplinary Matters Before the Oregon State
Bar, 3 ORE. ST. B. BULL. 9 (1937).
